 Central bank communication for the common good: how can Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy underpin central bankers’ communication as an instrument to foster a sense of legitimacy?Stefan Kesting and Hendrik Theine Chapter 12 in Central Banking, Monetary Policy and the Common Good, 2026, pp 223-245 from Edward Elgar Publishing Abstract: In recent years, central banks responded to the threat to their legitimacy and independence by increasing transparency as to their decision making and re-evaluating their communication, which has become a key instrument of managing the goals of monetary policy, financial regulatory and other policy interventions. This enhanced transparency is a response to the increased public and scientific scrutiny central banks have experienced owing to their growing power, the ubiquity of goals taken on by them, as well as the effects of central bank policymaking, for instance, on wealth and income distribution. Their policy goals range from inflation targeting and securing financial stability to underpinning public debt amassed in crises to dealing with climate change. We argue that transparent communication is not enough to support legitimacy and suggest stronger deliberative democratic embeddedness of central bank policies. This institutional proposal is based on Jürgen Habermas's ideas explained in his 1992 book Between Facts and Norms. Keywords: Central banks; Climate change; Deliberative democracy; Habermas; Legitimacy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:eechap:24020_12 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Chapters from Edward Elgar Publishing |
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