Auctions and market design: Thinking outside of the box

Charles A. Holt

Chapter 10 in The Origins and Evolution of Experimental Economics, 2026, pp 181-208 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Laboratory experiments, which have had such an impact on the author's own career, have also had a major impact on the design of auctions and mechanisms for allocating broadcast licenses, wind-energy leases, water and emissions permits, financial securities, college admissions, and medical residencies. This chapter surveys these applications, with a focus on practical implementation and experiment-based solutions to problems that arose in the context of each case.

Keywords: Auction Design; Hierarchical Package Bidding; Reference Price Auctions; Irrigation Reduction Auctions; Emission Permit Auctions; Matching Markets; Discount Window Stigma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035356256
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