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Political incentives in public–private partnerships: a conceptual framework and empirical evidence

Wei Xiong

Chapter 4 in The Origins and Evolution of Public–Private Partnerships, 2026, pp 72-89 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter challenges the view of public–private partnerships (PPPs) as purely technocratic tools, conceptualizing them instead as products of political incentives. It develops a framework analyzing how motivations, such as short time horizons, visibility bias, and fiscal opportunism, shape PPP adoption and design across different accountability systems. In electoral-accountability systems, electoral cycles drive the use of PPPs to deliver visible assets while deferring costs. In hierarchical administrative-accountability systems, bureaucratic promotion tournaments incentivize rapid project rollout to signal competence. The chapter explores how ideological narratives and accountability mechanisms moderate these incentives. It argues that while political motivations often lead to fiscal illusion and rent-seeking, robust institutional checks can channel political energy toward genuine public value. The analysis underscores that PPP outcomes are conditioned on the equilibrium between political ambition and institutional constraint.

Keywords: Political Incentives; Fiscal Illusion; Electoral Cycles; Political Economy; Infrastructure Politics; Accountability Mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035356553
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