From tensions to frictions: How federal democracy can fail

Arthur Benz

Chapter 7 in Understanding Federal Democracy, 2026, pp 120-140 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Whenever research on federal democracies uncovered democratic deficits or ineffective governance, it pointed out potential or real frictions within these complex systems of government. In contrast to tensions, which induce dynamics of power relations caused by conflicting effects of institutions, frictions materialize in enduring power imbalances, domination or gridlocks in governance. This chapter describes frictions that typically impend or occur in federal democracies. Focusing on the US and Switzerland as non-parliamentary and Australia, Canada and Germany as parliamentary federal democracies, it explains why the risk of frictions varies depending on institutional configurations of federal democracy.

Keywords: Domination; Friction; Inequality; Intergovernmental Lobbying; Joint-decision Trap; Power Imbalance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
ISBN: 9781035361489
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