Institutional versus constitutive social order and morality

Neil J. MacKinnon

Chapter 4 in The Social Psychology of Morality, 2025, pp 48-58 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: This chapter compares Talcott Parsons' institutional theory of morality as the product of the internalization of a society's institutionalized norms and values with Anne Rawls’ constitutive theory of morality as the outcome of an implicit moral agreement of mutual trust and commitment among individuals in face-to-face social interaction. The chapter traces Parsons’ shift from a micro-level, voluntaristic theory of action in his early work to a macro-level analysis of abstract systems in his later work, and the implications of this shift in level for his contributions to our understanding of morality. The chapter discusses Rawls’ claims that, compared to the inherent cultural relativism in the morality of institutional order, the moral principles of constitutive order (ethics, justice) are transcendental, and that constitutive order and morality are responsible for the emergence of social selves and mutual intelligibility (shared meaning).

Keywords: Talcott Parsons; Anne Rawls; Institutional morality; Constitutive morality; Social facts; Conceptual reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035364732
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