The market's entanglements with government

Christian Aspalter

Chapter 13 in Quantum Economics, 2025, pp 114-121 from Edward Elgar Publishing

Abstract: Continuing from where the last chapter ended, this chapter investigates the intersection of markets and governments. For this, the 2008 economic crisis will serve as an empirical-cum-pedagogical tool to provide the empirical support for the theory of human entanglements in the realm of real-life economics. Special attention is given to the role of costs, as all costs are easily determinable, easily measurable, and most consequential in economic and financial terms. Costs and profits determine prices (and not baselessly hyped-up notions of utility). Costs are economic/human entanglements. Expected profits are entanglements of expectations, projections of past costs, plus also the outcome of communication in the wider sense (media, etc.). Subsequently, governance is understood as neither being intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad. It is just that taxation is punishment for economic activities; for private activities, it distorts decision-making and individual planning. Taxation for the sake of taxation is bad. Taxation increases for the purpose of increasing political power (paybacks to one's political clientele, etc.) are bad. And so are subsidies, as they are all paid by taxation—usually for the most part taxing small and mid-sized companies and the small/common people.

Keywords: Taxation; Regulation; Economic subsidies; Political economy of government expenditures and government regulations; Good social policies versus bad social policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9781035366804
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