Sincere Scoring Rules

Matias Nuñez

No 2010-02, Thema Working Papers from THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS

Abstract: Approval Voting is shown to be the unique scoring rule that leads strategic voters to sincere behavior of three candidates elections in Poisson Games. However, Approval Voting can lead to insincere behavior in elections with more than three candidates.

Keywords: Sincerity; Approval Voting; Scoring rules; Poisson Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2010-02

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