U.S Presidential Elections and the Referendum Paradox

Fabrice Barthélémy (), Mathieu Martin and Ashley Piggins ()

No 2011-15, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: In the United States, the president is elected by the Electoral College (EC) and not directly by individual voters. This can give rise to a so-called referendum paradox in which one candidate receives more popular votes than any other, but this candidate is not elected. The 2000 election is an example of this phenomenon. Can the EC be reformed so that a referendum paradox never arises? We consider vary- ing three natural parameters. First, we consider changing the method of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives to states. Second, we consider changing the total number of seats in the House. Intuition suggests that as the number of seats approaches the number

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2011-15

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