Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

Sébastien Courtin, Mathieu Martin and Bertrand Tchantcho ()
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Bertrand Tchantcho: THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise

No 2012-36, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result. We expose the relationship between a weaker version of the Condorcet consistency principle and the scoring rules. Our main objective is then to study the condition on the quota that ensure that positional rules (simple and sequential) satisfy this principle.

Keywords: Positional; rules; (Simple; and; Sequential); .; Condorcet; Consistency; .; q-majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2012-36

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