Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case

Helmuts Azacis, Marie Laclau and Péter Vida

No 2024-07, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: We show that every rational correlated equilibrium of any finite game with complete information and four players can be implemented as a sequential equilibrium of a universally extended game, in which before choosing actions in the underlying game, players privately exchange cheap talk messages. In particular, we improve on the result of B´ar´any (1992) and Gerardi (2004). Our result can be generalized to games with incomplete information, i.e., to the set of regular communication equilibria.

Keywords: unmediated communication; sequential equilibrium; correlated equilibria; communication equilibria; communication protocols (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ipr and nep-mic
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