On the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in the Spatial Model with Dual Additive Valence

Mathieu Martin, Linus Thierry Nana Noumi, Zéphirin Nganmeni and Ashley Piggins ()
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Ashley Piggins: CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA

No 2026-03, Thema Working Papers from THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS

Abstract: In spatial voting games, the valence is traditionally modeled as a non-ideological attribute that is uniformly assigned to a candidate by all voters, independent of their policy preferences. In its original for-mulation, additive valence is assumed to be entirely detached from the candidate policy considerations. In this paper, we explore an alterna-tive framework in which additive valence interacts with the candidates' policy platforms. Each candidate possesses an individual valence level,but voters choose to recognize this valence only if the candidate is perceived as competent in defending their proposed policy. This perceived competence is assumed to be common knowledge among voters. The core objective of this study is to determine the conditions under which Nash equilibria arise in the context of electoral competition with policy-dependent additive valence.

Keywords: Spatial voting; Electoral competition; Dual valence; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2026-03

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