Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist: Corrigendum

César L. Guerrero Luchtenberg ()
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César L. Guerrero Luchtenberg: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE), México, D.F. Mexico

Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, 2002, vol. XI, issue 2, 431-443

Abstract: In this paper we make a new analysis of the model presented in Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984). They propose a model in discrete time, such that at each period a new cohort of agents enters the market –each cohort is composed by two types of agents, high value and low value agents– and a monopolist offering a durable good. They argue that in this model the monopolist charge a cyclic price path as a subgame perfect equilibrium. Instead of this, we show that either the monopolist charge a single price forever as a subgame perfect equilibrium or a subgame perfect equilibrium does not exist.

Keywords: Durable goods; monopolist; heterogenous agents; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emc:ecomex:v:11:y:2002:i:2:p:431-443

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