Persuasion under "Aspect-Restricted" Experimentation

Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

No DTE 625, Working Papers from CIDE, División de Economía

Abstract: This article explores information design in two-aspect-uncertainty environments un- der the assumption that the Sender is (exogenously) restricted to choosing only one of the aspects to design experiments over it. The equilibrium concept used incor- porates a "backwards-induction" requirement (for the initial aspect choice) to the Bayes-correlated equilibrium notion typically used in the information design literature. Optimal experimentation is driven by the marginal priors over the separate aspects, the joint priors about the state, and the players' preferences. Through the new information it discloses, optimal experimentation seeks to alleviate the original conflict of interests. For the two-action case, the optimal aspect choice and any optimal experiment are "tailor-designed" according to the preferences of the Receiver. The results provide a rationale for Senders deliberately selecting aspects in order to meet Receivers' tastes when they are constrained to selecting subsets of aspects from all the relevant aspects.

Keywords: experiment design; persuasion; linear optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2020-06
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