The Barcelona Football Club: A Different Referee Bias Case?

Fausto Hernandez-Trillo and Aaron Zaragoza ()
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Aaron Zaragoza: Department of Economics, CIDE

No DTE 642, Working Papers from CIDE, División de Economía

Abstract: This article analyzes the relationship between bribes and competitive success in matches of the First Division of Spain, based on the Negreira Case scandal, which exposed payments from Barcelona FC to Enríquez-Negreira while he was vice president of the Spanish Technical Committee of Referees. Drawing on an extensive self-constructed dataset, covering more than two decades of seasons, and employing various statistical and econometric techniques, this study delves into the potential association between bribery and the likelihood of an organization achieving more victories. The results reveal a significant positive relationship between the payments made by Barcelona FC and its competitive success, even after controlling for quality.

Keywords: Corruption; Barcelona; Football; LaLiga; Referee Bias; Negreira (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 Z0 Z2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul, nep-his and nep-spo
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