Board of Director Configurations in Mutual Fund Sponsors: Early Evidence of Board-Level Performance

Scott Besley, Steve P. Fraser and Christos Pantzalis

A chapter in Issues in Corporate Governance and Finance, 2007, pp 203-236 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: We examine the relationship between how mutual fund sponsors configure their board(s) of directors and the performance of the funds under a particular board's purview. Fund sponsors utilize either one board to oversee all the funds within a fund family or multiple boards that oversee one fund or a subset of the family's funds. Our results suggest that fund families – that is, sponsors – that use multiple boards have significantly higher objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess returns. But, there are no significant differences in the objective-adjusted board-level weighted excess expenses. These results are consistent with the argument that multiple boards provide superior monitoring.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:afeczz:s1569-3732(07)12009-0

DOI: 10.1016/S1569-3732(07)12009-0

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