Board monitoring and access to debt financing

Zhenyu Wu and Jess Chua

A chapter in Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 2009, pp 119-137 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: Board monitoring should affect a firm's access to debt financing because it improves firm performance and the board is ultimately responsible for the firm's debt. In this study, we show empirically that access to debt financing indeed benefits in two ways from board monitoring: directly from the monitoring and indirectly from improvement in performance. The methodological challenge is in separating the two effects from each other and from those of other drivers of debt financing.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... 3732(2009)0000013007
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:afeczz:s1569-3732(2009)0000013007

DOI: 10.1108/S1569-3732(2009)0000013007

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Advances in Financial Economics from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().