The political economy of revenue pressure and tax collection efficiency

Satya Das ()

Indian Growth and Development Review, 2011, vol. 4, issue 1, 38-52

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to develop a political‐economy model to show how political imperatives lead to reforms in administering direct tax collection. Design/methodology/approach - A static, political‐gain approach was used to model employment in the tax collection sector and then the implications of an increase in revenue pressure were derived through a comparative statics method. Findings - As revenue pressure increases, the “political value” in terms of granting employment falls and thus efficiency resulting from purely political motives decreases. Originality/value - This paper is an original work.

Keywords: Political economy; Economic growth; Economic development; Fiscal policy; Monetary policy; Taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:igdrpp:v:4:y:2011:i:1:p:38-52

DOI: 10.1108/17538251111124990

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