The role of agency costs in the voluntary adoption of XBRL-based financial reporting

Michael De Martinis, Mehdi Khedmati, Farshid Navissi, Mohammed Aminu Sualihu and Zakiya Tofik-Abu

International Journal of Managerial Finance, 2020, vol. 16, issue 5, 599-622

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how firm's agency costs played a role in the voluntary adoption of the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) under the SEC's voluntary filing program (VFP) that encouraged the voluntary adoption of the XBRL. Design/methodology/approach - This study employs a logistics regression and a sample of 140 firms that voluntarily participated in the VFP during its entire existence in the United States, and 140 matched-pair counterparts that did not voluntarily adopt the XBRL to investigate the role of agency costs in the voluntary adoption of XBRL-based financial reporting. Findings - We find evidence consistent with the conjecture that a firm's low magnitude of agency costs plays a significant motivating role in the voluntary adoption of XBRL-based financial reporting. Our results continue to hold after using an alternative measure of agency costs and conducting two-stage least squares regressions. Supplementing these results, the study also shows that the level of agency costs of voluntary XBRL adopters remains statistically unchanged after the adoption while the level of agency costs associated with the firms that did not participate in SEC's VFP significantly decline after the adoption during the XBRL mandate. Practical implications - The findings of this study suggest that based on a firm's level of agency costs, regulators and policymakers, especially those in countries that are yet to mandate XBRL reporting, can, in advance, identify firms that are more likely to comply with their new financial reporting initiatives. Originality/value - This paper provides first evidence on the role of agency costs in the voluntary adoption of XBRL using data from the United States.

Keywords: Agency costs; Information asymmetry; Voluntary adoption; XBRL (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:ijmfpp:ijmf-01-2019-0021

DOI: 10.1108/IJMF-01-2019-0021

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