Drivers of trust and trustworthiness

Jon Reiersen

International Journal of Social Economics, 2018, vol. 46, issue 1, 2-17

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of why people act trustworthily in anonymous non-repeated meetings where trustworthiness benefits the trustor and runs against the trustee’s material self-interest. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses a survey originally developed by Bicchieriet al.(2011). The survey makes it possible to explore whether trustworthiness has a normative element. Is there a norm of trustworthiness that inflicts punishment for disobedience? Findings - The participants in the experiment strongly believe that most people will punish untrustworthy behavior, lending support to the idea that trustworthiness is norm driven. The data provide little evidence for a parallel norm of trust. Originality/value - The theory of repeated games explains how trust can emerge among players in ongoing interactions. But why do people choose to trust others who they do not know in non-ongoing interactions? The results offer an explanation. When trustors are aware that trustworthiness is rooted in norms, they have reason to expect trustees to act trustworthily. Then, it makes sense to trust since trustors will benefit from their trusting.

Keywords: Trust; Beliefs; Punishment; Trustworthiness; Norms; C72; C91; D63; Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:ijsepp:ijse-01-2018-0025

DOI: 10.1108/IJSE-01-2018-0025

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