Great corruption – theory of corrupt phenomena

Vicente Monteverde

Journal of Financial Crime, 2020, vol. 28, issue 2, 580-592

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to formulate a new theory of corruption based on the discretionary decisions of the government and the distribution of income in the economy, where corruption pays taxes and is in the legal channels of the economy. Design/methodology/approach - The methodology is the practical exploration, based on events in the current Argentine economy, where this theory of corrupt phenomena is fulfilled, changing the approach to corruption, transforming corruption into legal. Findings - The document concludes that the model is applicable to any country in the world, given the conditions of the theory formulated. Research limitations/implications - There is a paradigm shift, it transforms corruption into legal. Practical implications - In this new theory of great corruption, the consequence is that it is very difficult to combat it, because it is developed based on legal, regulatory and ethical norms. Social implications - The social implications are through discretionary decisions of governments, large inequitable income redistributions, in favour of interest groups, pressure groups, private companies and the same state, with negative social consequences for the population. Originality/value - This theory is original; it has not been formulated in the study of the types of corruption in the world.

Keywords: Corruption; Rent seeking; Government decisions; Great corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfcpps:jfc-07-2019-0104

DOI: 10.1108/JFC-07-2019-0104

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