Banks’ audit committees, audit firm alumni and fees paid to audit firm
Kim Ittonen,
Emma-Riikka Myllymäki and
Per Christen Tronnes
Managerial Auditing Journal, 2019, vol. 34, issue 7, 783-807
Abstract:
Purpose - This paper focuses on bank audit committees and examines whether audit committee members who are former auditors are associated with the acquisition of audit and non-audit services from their former employers. Design/methodology/approach - The study empirically examines a sample of large banks that are included in the S&P Composite 1500. Findings - The paper reports significantly lower audit fees and a higher proportion of non-audit fees to total fees when the audit committee chair is an alumnus of the incumbent audit firm. Moreover, additional analysis reveals that these findings are stronger for banks with more earnings management. Research limitations/implications - Overall, the findings indicate that audit firms might consider banks using their alumni as audit committee chairs to be less risky or easier to audit, thus requiring relatively less effort from the auditors. The reduced effort required to audit clients with audit firm alumni on their audit committees then has the effect of reducing the audit fees charged. Alternatively, their auditing experience and cognitive proximity might influence the assessment of the need for auditing or the ability to negotiate lower audit fees on the part of audit firm alumni. Originality/value - This paper provides empirical evidence of the association between audit firm alumni in influential positions on an audit committee and fees paid to those audit firms in the banking industry. The findings contribute to the literature by suggesting that banks with affiliated former auditors chairing their audit committees not only have significantly lower audit fees but also a higher proportion is spent on non-audit services.
Keywords: Audit fees; Banks; Audit committee; Audit firm alumni; Non-audit fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:maj-01-2018-1766
DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-01-2018-1766
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