Audit quality and debt restructuring: evidence from Italy
Carlotta Magri and
Pier Luigi Marchini
Managerial Auditing Journal, 2023, vol. 39, issue 1, 50-70
Abstract:
Purpose - This study aims to investigate the link between audit quality and in-court debt restructuring. The aim is to understand whether the confirmation of debt restructuring plans is affected by audit quality, which, in the light of agency theory, reduces information asymmetries between outsiders (creditors and the court) and insiders (shareholders and managers) of the debtor company. Design/methodology/approach - A logistic regression is performed to test whether higher audit quality is associated with an increased probability of successfully completing a debt restructuring proceeding (RP). Consistent with the literature, audit quality is assessed ex ante based on auditor size, which is used as a proxy for independence. The analysis considers private Italian companies. Findings - Audit quality positively affects debt restructuring. Among financially distressed companies, those audited by an audit company are more likely to succeed in RPs than those audited by a single practitioner. There is no evidence of a Big N effect. Originality/value - This study fills a gap in literature as, in contrast to other financial and governance characteristics, audit quality has never been studied before as a determinant of efficient restructuring. It contributes to the literature on auditing and governance by highlighting the importance of audit quality in complex situations such as RPs, and it expands on debt restructuring literature by considering the importance of the information exchanged during RPs.
Keywords: Audit quality; Information asymmetry; Restructuring proceeding; Insolvency; G34; M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:majpps:maj-01-2023-3794
DOI: 10.1108/MAJ-01-2023-3794
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