Actavis, Authorized Generics, and the Future of Antitrust Law

Marc G. Schildkraut

A chapter in Healthcare Antitrust, Settlements, and the Federal Trade Commission, 2018, vol. 28, pp 25-88 from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Abstract: The Supreme Court’s decision inFederal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. is a challenge to conventional antitrust analysis. Conventional civil antitrust cases are decided by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that conduct challenged under the rule of reason is only condemned if the conduct resulted in more competitive harm in the actual world than a world without the alleged violation. Under conventional analysis, the intent of the parties also plays only a supporting role in determining whether the conduct was anticompetitive. A holder of a valid patent has a right to exclude others practicing the patented technology. And, the patent holder is not assumed to have market power because it expended resources in maintaining exclusionary rights.Actaviscreates doubts about these propositions in circumstances beyond the “reverse” payment settlement of a patent suit that may have delayed an alleged infringer market entry. This chapter explores whether applyingActavislogic to antitrust litigation can result in condemnation of practices where there is little chance of an anticompetitive effect, where the patent holder likely has a valid and infringed patent, where there is little reason to believe that the patent holder has market power, and where only one party, or no parties, to an agreement have an anticompetitive intent. This chapter also investigates whetherActaviscreates new problems with standing analysis, damages calculations, and the balancing of efficiencies against anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, the lower courts have begun to extend the logic ofActavis.This is apparent in the condemnation of no-Authorized-generic settlements.

Keywords: Actavis; antitrust; settlement; patent; generic; Sherman; K2; L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rlwezz:s0193-589520180000028002

DOI: 10.1108/S0193-589520180000028002

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