Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance

George Hendrikse

ERIM Report Series Research in Management from Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract: Fruit and vegetable marketing organization The Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling, access, and countervailing power. This model does not only explain the changes at The Greenery, but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance.

Keywords: channel governance; cooperatives; foreclosure; incomplete contracts; market power; pooling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M M13 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/22815/ERS-2011-009-ORG.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ems:eureri:22815

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ERIM Report Series Research in Management from Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePub ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).