Het disciplineringsmodel voorbij; over autoriteit en legitimiteit in Corporate Governance

Hans van Oosterhout

ERIM Inaugural Address Series Research in Management from Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Abstract: In this inaugural address, it is argued that the field of corporate governance is focused too much on the agency problems between managers and shareholders that result from the separation of ownership and control in public companies. It is argued that the currently dominant managerial disciplining model of corporate governance should be broadened by including: (1) the benefits of centralized decision-making and managerial authority in public firms (and other forms of enterprise organization), (2) the distinct corporate governance problems of other forms of enterprise organization, and (3) issues of legitimacy that that arise when corporate actions unlawfully or disproportionally hurt the interests of third parties outside the firm.

Keywords: aandeelhouders; bestuursautoriteit; compliance; legitimiteit; stakeholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 M M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09-12
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