Conflict and the foundations of private property

Pablo Sanchez () and Jaume Sempere
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Pablo Sanchez: El Colegio de Mexico

Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos from El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos

Abstract: In this paper agents can create private property rights on a resource by making appropriative activities. We show that the value of the resource has a nonmonotonic effect on the emergence of private property. When the resource is sufficiently valuable, agents have an incentive to leave a sharing agreement and private property can appear. If the value of the resource increases beyond a given threshold, deviations from the sharing agreement lead to a very costly confrontation so in order to avoid that, agents stick to the agreement. In that case, private property is not sustainable. On the other hand, it is shown that populations size has an important effect on the size of the parameter set in which private property is sustainable

Keywords: private property; conflict; coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2016-03

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