On uniqueness of equilibrium prices in a Bayesian assignment game

David Cantala () and Damián Gibaja ()
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David Cantala: El Colegio de México
Damián Gibaja: Universidad Popular Autonoma del Estado de Puebla

Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos from El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos

Abstract: In the Assignment Game [Shapley and Shubik, 1971], most solution concepts yield a multiplicity of solutions. We study the Assignment game in a Bayesian environment where neither buyers nor sellers know the valuation of other players, and derive conditions on the distribution of valuations to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium. Also, we provide a closed-form solution when valuations follow an exponential distribution.

Keywords: assignment game; uniqueness; Newton's method; contraction mapping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2018-06

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