An Institutional Frame to Compare Alternative Market Designs in EU Electricity Balancing

Jean Michel Glachant () and Marcello Saguan
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Jean Michel Glachant: University of Paris Sud, Faculté Jean-Monnet
Marcello Saguan: Supélec and University of Paris Sud, Paris

No EPRG 0711, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Electricity Forward Market; Balancing Mechanism; Risk Aversion; Penalty; Institutional Frame; Market Design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D8 L51 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-01
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