Generalized Nash Equilibrium and Market Coupling in the European Power System

Yves Smeers (), Giorgia Oggioni, Elisabetta Allevi and Siegfried Schaible
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Yves Smeers: Universit´e catholique de Louvain, School of Engineering (INMA) and CORE, Belgium
Giorgia Oggioni: University of Brescia, Department of Quantitative Methods, Italy
Elisabetta Allevi: University of Brescia, Department of Quantitative Methods, Italy
Siegfried Schaible: Chung Yuan Christian University, Department of Applied Mathematics, Taiwan

No EPRG 1016, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Generalized Nash Equilibrium; Quasi-Variational Inequalities; Market Coupling; Counter-Trading; European Electricity Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 D58 Q40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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