Using rewards and penalties to incentivize energy and water saving behaviour in agriculture: evidence from a choice experiment in Punjab

Sukhgeet Kaur and Michael Pollitt

No EPRG2407, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Agriculture; energy water nexus; entitlement; incentive; groundwater; irrigation; electricity consumption; paddy; subsidy; electricity pricing; discrete choice; Punjab (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q1 Q12 Q24 Q25 Q28 Q4 Q48 Q5 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dcm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-reg
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