MEPs Vote: Between Independence and “Insincere” Voting

Luiza Soare

Europolity – Continuity and Change in European Governance - Old Series, 2010, vol. 4, issue 2, 26-34

Abstract: One of the most important transformations within the European Union are those regarding the European Parliament. Thus, the gradual increase of power in the decision making process captured the attention of researchers, who raised the problem of the MEPs behaviour during the vote. It is why, in this paper, I intend to sustain with arguments and examples the hypothesis of a one insincere voting. Based on the evident relations between the MEPs and the national parties, with the Presidents of the European groups or with the labour Commissions, I will came with counters for those who believe in the independence in voting, also raising the idea of the inevitability of the insincere voting.

Keywords: MEPs; national parties; European party groups; parliamentary committees; insincere voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epl:eplold:y:2010:v:4:i:2:p:26-34

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