Partis islamistes, Pouvoir et Etat profond dans le monde arabe: analyse en termes du Principal-Agent

Brahim Elmorchid ()
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Brahim Elmorchid: Faculté de Droit, Marrakech

No 782, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: The arrival of Islamist parties to power in some Arab countries (Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) increases hopes for the people. But the strong mobilization of representative Deep State structures has created a climate of uncertainty. Because of its strong ability to respond, the deep state is able to cause serious harm to any attempt to change aspired by Islamists. Using the Principal-Agent Approach, we show that in the absence of asymmetric information, there is an optimal risk sharing between the Deep State (Principal) and the Islamist Government (Agent). Both parties have the opportunity to enter into an implicit and informal contract that allows them to preserve not only their interests but also those of the nation. Given the risk of escalation, it seems that the analyzed Arab countries still need a strong and benevolent Deep State.

Pages: 19
Date: 2013-10, Revised 2013-10
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Published by The Economic Research Forum (ERF)

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