Financial Constraints Risk Aversion and Sharecropping in Rainfed Agriculture: Application to North West Tunisia

Mohamed Matoussi () and Neji Saidi ()
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Mohamed Matoussi: University of Tunis-El-Manar

No 880, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: Laffont and Matoussi (1995) have developed a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the provision of effort and financial constraints. Their Empirical Investigation was based on irrigated agriculture. Our contribution is then a generalization of this work to the context of rainfed agriculture, which provides the essential of food production in semi-arid countries like Tunisia. Two innovations will be introduced: a sequential choice of the landlord behavior in the selection of the optimal contract and the test of the role of financial constraint and risk aversion in the contract determination in the context of non-irrigated agriculture.

Pages: 16
Date: 2014-11, Revised 2014-11
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