Securing the Rule of Law through Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument from Comparative Law

Richard Stith

No 1, Jean Monnet Working Papers from Jean Monnet Chair

Abstract: Abstract: As the distinction between interpretation and politics diminishes, the need for pluralism in interpretation increases. The Article argues, first, that the rule of law requires that no one tribunal possess the power to subordinate a whole legal system to its politicized rule. The Article then uses comparative legal study to analyze plural or coordinate interpretive authority. A multiplicity of interpreters helps to prevent domination by any one legal ideology and to encourage reasoned dialogue about the meaning of law. Despite our skeptical age, courts and other public authorities are given an incentive to construct arguments convincingly moored to governing law.

Keywords: centralisation/decentralisation; constitution building; constitutional change; diversity/homogeneity; federalism; governance; institutionalisation; organization theory; organization theory; pluralism; supranationalism; acquis communautaire; comparative law; competences; European law; German Constitutional Court; judicial review; rule of law; subsidiarity; supremacy; Constitution for Europe; treaty reform; decentralisation; joint decision making; European Court of Justice; European Court of Justice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05-25
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