Feeding the Leviathan

Pablo Guillen, Christiane Schwieren and Gianandrea Staffiero

IESA Working Papers Series from Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research

Abstract: Using a step-level public good game, we analyze the e.ects on contributions of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that "educational" effects, in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards "good" equilibria, are more relevant than motivational "crowding out" effects, whereby cooperating to avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal only when this decision entails a clear "trust" message.

Keywords: Public Good; Step-level; Sanctioning Institution; Cooperation; Education; Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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