Express Yourself: The Price of Fairness in a Simple Distribution Game

Andreas Nicklisch ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: A simple two-person distribution game similar to the ultimatum game is introduced. However, unlike the standard ultimatum game, responders can determine the payoff for the proposer in case of rejection. Therefore, they can express their concerns in monetary quantities. The experimental data are analyzed with respect to inequity aversion and intended punishment. The analysis casts doubt on a single motivation of responders' actions, but supports a combination of reciprocity and inequity aversion. ased on these findings, the data support a simple model for distribution preferences based on an increasing price for exposing responders to unkind offers.

Keywords: ultimatum bargaining; inequity aversion; efficiency concerns; fairness preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe
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