Finders, Keepers?

Niko Jaakkola and Daniel Spiro

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Natural resource taxation and investment often exhibit cyclical behaviour, associated with shifts in political power. Why do finders get to keep more of their discoveries in some periods than others? This paper shows such cycles result from the inability of governments to commit to future taxes and firms to commit to credibly exiting a country for good. In a cycle, large resource revenues induce a high tax, which lowers exploration investment, and thereby future findings, which in turn leads governments to reduce tax rates again. This paper documents evidence of cyclical behaviour in several countries with both strong and weak institutions, and provides detailed case studies of two Latin American countries. [Working Paper 22421]

Keywords: Natural resource taxation; government revenue; cyclical behaviour; tax oscillations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
Note: Institutional Papers
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.esocialsciences.org/Articles/show_Artic ... onalPapers&aid=11118
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 503 Service Unavailable

Related works:
Journal Article: Finders, keepers? (2019)
Working Paper: Finders, Keepers? (2017)
Working Paper: Finders, Keepers? (2016)
Working Paper: Finders, Keepers? (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:11118

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from eSocialSciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Padma Prakash ().