E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India

Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo (), Clément Imbert, Santhosh Mathew () and Rohini Pande ()

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: In collaboration with the Government of Bihar, India, a large-scale experiment is conducted to evaluate whether transparency in fiscal transfer systems can increase accountability and reduce corruption in the implementation of a workfare program. The reforms introduced electronic fund-flow, cut out administrative tiers, and switched the basis of transfer amounts from forecasts to documented expenditures. Treatment reduced leakages along three measures: expenditures and hours claimed dropped while an independent household survey found no impact on actual employment and wages received; a matching exercise reveals a reduction in fake households on payrolls; and local program officials’ self-reported median personal assets fell. [BREAD Working Paper 494].

Keywords: constrain; social programs; costs; program inefficiency; administrative structure and streamlined organization; monetary incentives; low-income countries; corruption; communications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
Note: Institutional Papers
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Journal Article: E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India (2020)
Working Paper: E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India (2019)
Working Paper: E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India (2017)
Working Paper: E-Governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India (2016)
Working Paper: E-governance, Accountability, and Leakage in Public Programs: Experimental Evidence from a Financial Management Reform in India (2016)
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