Corruption, Default and Optimal Credit in Welfare Programs

Bibhas Saha and Trivikraman Thampy ()

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: In this paper a dynamic model of subsidized credit provision is presented to examine how asymmetric information exacerbates inefficiency caused by corruption. Though designed to empower the underprivileged, the fate of such credit programs largely depends on the efficiency of the credit delivery system. [IGIDR WP 2004-001].

Keywords: credit; corruption; asymmetric; information; inefficiency; delivery; system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
Note: Institutional Papers
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Working Paper: Corruption, Default and Optimal Credit in Welfare Programs (2004)
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