Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized Trials in the Game of Cricket

V Bhaskar

Economics Discussion Papers from University of Essex, Department of Economics

Abstract: In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision is assigned via a coin toss. We utilize these “randomized trials” to examine (a) the consistency of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences, and (b) the treatment effects of chosen actions. We find significant evidence of inconsistency, with teams often agreeing on who is to bat first. Estimated treatment effects show that choices are often poorly made since they reduce the probability of the team winning.

Keywords: decision theory; zero sum situation; randomized trial; treatment effects. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized Trials in the Game of Cricket (2004)
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