Elections and Political Polarisation: Challenges for Environmental Agreements

Sarah Spycher
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Sarah Spycher: Sustainability Economics Group, M-TEC, ETH Zurich

No 26/406, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: This paper examines how domestic elections and political polarisation shape international environmental agreements. Using a four-stage game to model a bilateral treaty, I analyse how incumbents strategically balance policy preferences with re-election prospects. Results reveal asymmetric electoral constraints: green incumbents must severely temper their ambitions to secure domestic ratification, whereas brown incumbents face fewer constraints and can effectively shift abatement burdens abroad. This asymmetry highlights a strategic delegation motive among voters that inherently advantages brown governments. Ultimately, these dynamics, which are amplified under high polarisation, explain how domestic electoral competition can structurally undermine ambitious global climate cooperation.

Keywords: Wildfires; international climate policy; political economy; elections; political polarisation; strategic delegation; treaty design; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2026-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eth:wpswif:26-406

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