Constraint Substitution and the Failure of Decision Authority in Family Offices

Roshan Ghadamian
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Roshan Ghadamian: Institute for Regenerative Systems Architecture

IRSA Working Papers from Institute for Regenerative Systems Architecture

Abstract: Family offices are usually described as facing governance problems of intergenerational conflict, unclear objectives and institutional immaturity, and the sector's answer has been professionalisation: formal structures, expert advisers, risk frameworks. Yet a distinctive failure persists through all of it — an inability to decide anything consequential in situations where capital, intent, expertise and time are all present. This paper argues that the pattern is not misalignment, not values conflict and not insufficient governance. It is constraint substitution: factors that should discipline how a decision is executed come to determine whether it can be made at all. Capital preservation, liability exposure, accumulated objections, moral discomfort and procedural requirement each function as an implicit veto, and authority is not overridden or transferred but extinguished — with no rule broken and no actor opposing anything. Five such dynamics are identified. Individually each is defensible; stacked, they produce an authority vacuum in which no actor is authorised to decide and non-decision is the stable equilibrium, because inaction can be justified as prudence while action requires someone to accept residual risk. That mechanism explains why professionalisation so often makes matters worse: it multiplies constraints while leaving decision rights implicit, and it raises the personal cost of being the one who decides. The paper's contribution is diagnostic, and its design implication is a single reordering — authority protection is a precondition for long-horizon stewardship, not a product of good governance.

Keywords: constraint substitution; decision authority; family offices; authority vacuum; non-decision; professionalisation; private capital governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D73 G23 G34 L26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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