What Happens When Some Agents Over-Demand in Claims Problems

Xiuxia Yin (), Pedro Calleja () and Josep Maria Izquierdo ()
Additional contact information
Xiuxia Yin: Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics. Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT
Pedro Calleja: Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics. Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT
Josep Maria Izquierdo: Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics. Universitat de Barcelona and BEAT

No 2025/490, UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In claims problems, we explore three characterizations of the constrained equal awards rule based on how allocations respond to an agent increasing its claim. In the first one we ensure that over-demanding by an unsatisfied agent does not harm others. In the second one we require that such over-demanding leaves the entire allocation unchanged. Finally, in the third one we weaken this last condition by protecting only the initially fully compensated agents.

Keywords: Claims problems; Over-demand proofness; Expansion invariance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224747 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ewp:wpaper:490web

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UB School of Economics Working Papers from University of Barcelona School of Economics Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by University of Barcelona School of Economics ().