Conditional Cooperation and Group Size: Experimental Evidence from a Public Good Game

Tianyi Li and Charles Noussair

No 2023-04, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Conditional cooperation is the tendency to cooperate if and only if others do so as well. It is the most common behavior in social dilemmas. We study how the incidence of conditional cooperation in the Public Goods game, the most widely studied social dilemma in experimental economics, varies with group size. In a laboratory experiment, we apply the strategy method to elicit how participants\' willingness to contribute to a public good depends on other group members\' decisions. A within-subject design allows us to evaluate and compare an individual participant\'s contribution behavior in different-sized groups. Two main findings emerge. First, the share of players who are conditional cooperators is consistent across group sizes. Second, the strategies chosen imply that conditional cooperators hold a (correct) belief that others are more cooperative in a larger than in a smaller group.

Keywords: Conditional Cooperation; Public Goods; Strategy Method; Group Size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2023-06
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Journal Article: Conditional cooperation and group size: experimental evidence from a public good game (2024)
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