Posted vs. Negotiated Prices under Incompelte Information

Piergiovanna Natale ()

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of selecting pricing institutions in a bilateral monopoly. Suppose a bayer and seller can benefit from exchanging one unit of a good. The selelr is entitled to select the pricing institution. He can either make a take-it-leave-it offer or enter a bargaining game.

Keywords: INFORMATION; BARGAINING; PRICING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D49 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9603

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