Game Theoretic Models of Wage Bargaining

Paola Manzini

Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: Rather than a complete survey, this paper aims at being a tool to help apply game theoretic bergaining models to wage negotiations. In this perspective we review a number of articles which explicitly deal with wage determination as well as purely game theoretical models which we believe can be fruitfully extended to account for specific features of labour markets.

Keywords: BARGAINING; WAGES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Game Theoretic Models of Wage Bargaining (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exe:wpaper:9615

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