La corruzione amministrativa in una burocrazia di tipo concorrenziale: modelli di analisi economica

Franco Amisano

ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, 2003, vol. 2003/5, issue 5

Abstract: Franco Amisano (di Franco Amisano) - ABSTRACT: The paper analyses the administrative corruption in a bureaucracy whose officials have overlapping jurisdictions (competitive bureaucracy). Analysis has been performed through models of demand and supply of the services provided by officials accepting bribes. Diffusion of corruption in the bureaucracy and possible equilibrium situations have been examined through models introducing several probability densities for the corruption costs of the individual bureaucrats.

Date: 2003
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