Aeroporti e compagnie aeree: analisi e valutazione del sistema di regolazione in Italia

Oliviero Baccelli

ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, 2007, vol. 2007/2, issue 2, 139-167

Abstract: Airports and airlines: elements for a new regulatory framework in Italy - The paper analyses the evolution of the regulatory framework of the airport systems in Italy. The first part of the paper addresses the question why it is so difficult to regulate the Italian airports by commenting on the main problems regulators had to face in the period 2000-2007. The second part is dedicated to an analysis of the new law that will be implemented in coming months after the approval of the ministerial decree that will design the details of the new regulatory system. The starting point of an analysis as to how airports should be regulated is the ICAO?s policies on charges for airports. In setting price controls for Italian airports, the regulators are required to take the following objectives into accounts: to promote the efficient, economic and profitable operation of such airports and to encourage new directly financed investment in new facilities at airports in time to satisfy anticipated demands by the users of such airports. The current regulatory system leaving aside the issues raised in the debate over dual versus single till has been completely ineffective in delivering investments provided by the airports to meet the growing demand of airlines and passengers. The conclusion of the paper is dedicated to answer the question of how the interests of users are best served by different regulatory policies and decisions, taking into account the nature of the Italian market. In fact most of the Italian regional airports should not be regulated and the complex regulatory framework should be simplified. The implications of this model are the increasing importance of completing a case-by -case ex ante evaluation of the competition assessment of secondary airports in several regions and than to concentrate the price controls efforts on the main airports that are in a monopolistic position. The economic principles supporting this model are clear. Market regulation is an outcome second-best to what should be achieved in a competitive market, while in the case there is still a case for regulation of airport activities strong incentives should be introduced to simplify the process negotiation between regulators and airports operators. Jel classification: L510, L930, R480

Date: 2007
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