Two-Stage Quantity-Setting Games and Tacit Collusion

Kazuhiro Ohnishi ()
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Kazuhiro Ohnishi: Osaka University

Finnish Economic Papers, 2011, vol. 24, issue 1, 64-77

Abstract: This paper considers a two-stage quantity-setting duopoly model. The paper classifies demand functions into the following four cases in terms of the goods relevance and strategic relevance between both firms: ‘substitute goods and strategic substitutes’, ‘substitute goods and strategic complements’, ‘complementary goods and strategic complements’ and ‘complementary goods and strategic substitutes’. The paper correlates each case with two opposite strategic commitments. The paper examines the possibility of tacit collusion in each of four cases.

JEL-codes: C72 D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fep:journl:v:24:y:2011:i:1:p:64-77

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