Does information increase the take-up of social benefits? Evidence from a new benefit program

Tuomas Matikka and Tuuli Paukkeri

No 83, Working Papers from VATT Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: The effectiveness of transfer programs can be significantly reduced if eligible individuals fail to apply for them. In this paper we study the impact of information provision on the take-up of social benefits. We exploit the implementation of the guarantee pension program in Finland in 2011, which offered a minimum monthly pension (688 euros) to low-income pensioners. The Finnish Social Insurance Institution sent information letters and application forms to a portion of the eligible population a month before implementation. We find clear evidence that this mailing significantly increased take-up and prompted pensioners to apply sooner, showing that simple and inexpensive mailings can have a large effect on benefit take-up among individuals outside the labor force.

Keywords: social security; social benefits; impact of information; guarantee pension; sosiaalietuuksien alikäyttö; informaatio; Social security; taxation and inequality; D03; H24; H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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